Aviation · United States

Aviation counts duty hours. Its people run on sleep.

Pilots, cabin crew and controllers work early starts, nights and time-zone changes. Duty limits cap hours, not sleep obtained, and a fatigue lapse in flight or on the ground can be catastrophic.

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Who this page covers

Aeromedical retrieval services (also see Healthcare & Nursing)
Air freight and express airlines
Air traffic control
Aircraft maintenance (MRO) and line engineering
Airlines - cabin crew
Airlines - flight crew (pilots)
Airport operators (also see Emergency Services, Retail & Hospitality, Security Services)
Charter, regional, helicopter and offshore helicopter operators
Ground handling - ramp, baggage, fuel, cargo

Reg Watch

What’s changed, and what’s coming

Regulatory change that affects how you manage fatigue in aviation: what has changed in the last 12 months, and what is on the way.

Upcoming changeNo date set yet

The Fatigued Pilot Protection Act (H.R. 7191), introduced 21 January 2026, would require the FAA to apply Part 117 flight, duty and rest limits to all-cargo pilots within 180 days of enactment. It sits with the House Aviation Subcommittee with no markup as at 1 October 2026.

Regulatory changes checked as at October 1, 2026.

Regulation

Who regulates it, and what they expect

Aviation carries the most specific fatigue rules of any US industry, but they reach a narrow slice of it. 14 CFR Part 117 caps flight and duty time and mandates rest for flightcrew in Part 121 passenger operations only; all-cargo Part 121 flying, Part 135 charter and Part 91 subpart K fractional operations sit outside it. Part 117 does one thing no other US rule does: it requires each pilot to state, before every flight, that they are fit for duty. Cargo, charter, maintenance, ramp and dispatch staff rely on general workplace safety law instead.

Regulated by

Logos identify the regulator and don’t imply endorsement.

Who regulates it

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sets binding duty and rest rules for airline pilots and flight attendants, and governs fatigue policy for its own air traffic controllers. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigates fatigue in accidents. Where these rules don't reach - charter, corporate, cargo, ground operations - the general OSHA workplace-safety baseline still applies.

Your obligations

Part 121 passenger flightcrew are limited to 8 or 9 hours flight time with a minimum crew, and flight duty periods of 9 to 14 hours unaugmented or up to 19 hours with an augmented crew and an onboard rest facility. They must have at least 10 consecutive hours rest before duty, containing an uninterrupted 8-hour sleep opportunity, and 30 consecutive hours free of duty in any 168. Each carrier must run an FAA-approved fatigue education and awareness training program, retrained annually and updated every two years, and must hold a Fatigue Risk Management Plan accepted by the FAA.

Consequences

The FAA can assess civil penalties of up to $75,000 per violation against a company and $1,875 against an individual or small business, for violations occurring on or after 30 December 2024 and unchanged in 2026. It can suspend or revoke a pilot's certificate or the operator's own certificate. A crewmember who accepts an assignment while too fatigued to perform safely breaches Part 117 personally, not just their employer. The NTSB examines fatigue in accident investigations, and its published findings drive both regulatory attention and civil claims.

Penalties

FAA civil penalties under 49 U.S.C. 46301: up to $75,000 per violation for a company and $1,875 for an individual or small business, for violations on or after 30 December 2024, still the amounts in force in 2026. Certificate suspension and revocation also available.

Sources: FAA flight and duty limits (14 CFR Part 117, Tables A, B and C); FAA flight attendant rest rule (14 CFR 121.467); the FAA final rule excluding all-cargo operations (77 FR 330); Part 135 flight time and rest rules; FAA civil penalty schedule (14 CFR 13.301); OSHA General Duty Clause.

Fatigue-critical roles

Where fatigue matters most in aviation

The roles where a fatigued worker is most likely to cause serious harm, the tasks that carry the risk, and why fatigue builds up in them.

Role	Risk	High-risk tasks	Why fatigue builds
Airline pilot (captain / first officer) Rules Regulatory designation Flightcrew member (14 CFR 117.3) in Part 121 operations; first-class medical (14 CFR Part 67); safety-sensitive (14 CFR Part 120) Hours and rest 14 CFR Part 117: 9-14 h unaugmented FDP, 10 h rest incl. 8 h sleep opportunity, 30 h free in 168; all-cargo may stay on Part 121 Subparts Q-S	Critical risk	Flying approaches and landings after extended duty or through the window of circadian low; multi-sector days; managing non-normal events at the end of a duty	Early report times, overnight flights, time-zone crossing, reserve and standby, short-notice roster changes
Air traffic control specialist (FAA) Rules Regulatory designation Air traffic control specialist; DOT-covered safety-sensitive employee for drug and alcohol testing Hours and rest FAA Order JO 7210.3: at least 10 h between shifts, 12 h before a shift mostly between 22:30 and 06:30	Critical risk	Separating traffic on low-workload overnight positions, sometimes single-person; handling the morning surge at the end of a night shift; coordination and handovers	24/7 rotating shifts with quick returns, night shifts, single-person night operations at some units
Aviation maintenance technician (A&P mechanic) Rules Regulatory designation Certificated mechanic (14 CFR Part 65 Subpart D); safety-sensitive (14 CFR Part 120) Hours and rest 14 CFR 121.377: relief from duty for 24 consecutive hours in any 7 days (or monthly equivalent)	Critical risk	Night-shift line and base maintenance; flight-control rigging, torque and duplicate-inspection tasks; certifying release to service at the end of a long shift	Night shifts to meet first-wave departures, AOG overtime, 12 h shifts, rotating rosters
HEMS / Part 135 pilot Rules Regulatory designation Flight crewmember (14 CFR Part 135); first- or second-class medical Hours and rest 14 CFR 135.271 (HEMS): 10 h rest before assignment, 8 h rest in any 24 h, assignment max 72 h; 135.267 unscheduled limits	Critical risk	Single-pilot night aeromedical or charter flights after an on-call call-out; helicopter landings at unlit sites; IFR approaches at the end of duty	On-call and standby with night call-outs, single-pilot operations, remote bases
Flight attendant Rules Regulatory designation Flight attendant (14 CFR 121.467); safety-sensitive (14 CFR Part 120) Hours and rest 14 CFR 121.467: 10 consecutive hours rest after a duty of 14 h or less, not reducible	High risk	Safety and emergency duties, evacuation command and in-flight incident response after long or overnight duties; door arming and cross-checks	Early starts, overnight and long-haul duties, multi-sector days, time-zone crossing, standby
Ramp agent (ramp service agent) Rules Regulatory designation None specific - general duty (OSH Act s 5(a)(1)) Hours and rest None federal (FLSA prices overtime, does not cap hours)	High risk	Aircraft pushback and towing; baggage tug driving and loading near engines and stairs; refuelling hook-ups on overnight turns	Split shifts and starts from 04:00, night freight turns, overtime in peaks, outdoor work

Stories

When fatigue made the record

Published findings and prosecutions from regulators, courts and investigators in the United States.

Jul 2017 · California, United States
Airliner lines up on occupied taxiway; crew fatigue contributed
- Safety
A foreign airline's narrow-body airliner cleared to land at a major California airport lined up on a taxiway occupied by four loaded airliners and overflew them before going around. The NTSB found the crew's fatigue, from circadian disruption and length of continued wakefulness, contributed. The captain had been awake more than 19 hours.
Case US-aviation-07Report an issue
Aug 2013 · Alabama, United States
Cargo jet crashes short of runway; first officer fatigued from sleep loss
- Safety
A cargo airline's wide-body freighter struck terrain short of the runway at an Alabama airport on a pre-dawn approach, killing both pilots. The NTSB found the first officer's fatigue from acute sleep loss, poor use of off-duty time and circadian factors contributed, and that the captain's performance deficiencies were likely due to factors including fatigue.
Case US-aviation-06Report an issue
Dec 2011 · Nevada, United States
Fatigued mechanic and inspector miss a flight-control fault after an early shift change; air tour helicopter crashes, five killed
- Safety
An air tour helicopter operated by an air tour company lost control and crashed after a flight-control input rod separated in flight, killing the pilot and four passengers. The NTSB found that the rod came loose because of inadequate maintenance and postmaintenance inspection the day before. Both the mechanic and the quality control inspector had been moved to a shift starting about 6 hours earlier than normal, and the NTSB found their fatigue contributed to the errors.
Case US-aviation-17Report an issue
Mar 2011 · Virginia, United States
Lone night-shift tower controller falls asleep; two airliners land without clearance
- Safety
- Financial
During a midnight shift a lone air traffic controller in the control tower at a major city airport could not be raised, and two airliners landed without contact with the tower. The National Transportation Safety Board found the controller had lost consciousness because of lack of sleep and fatigue from working successive midnight shifts, and named the federal aviation agency's scheduling practices as part of the cause. The agency added a second person to midnight shifts and lengthened the minimum time off between shifts.
Case US-aviation-10Report an issue
Feb 2008 · Hawaii, United States
Both pilots fall asleep in cruise; captain had undiagnosed severe sleep apnea
- Safety
On a short inter-island flight with 40 passengers, both pilots of a regional jet fell asleep during cruise and the aircraft flew about 26 miles past its destination before they woke and returned to land safely. The National Transportation Safety Board found the cause was the pilots inadvertently falling asleep, with the captain's undiagnosed obstructive sleep apnea and the crew's recent schedules of repeated early-morning starts as contributing factors. The captain was diagnosed with severe sleep apnea three months later, and the first officer had built up a sleep debt over the previous three days.
Case US-aviation-08Report an issue
Apr 2007 · Michigan, United States
Tired crew skip landing-distance check after midnight; regional jet overruns snowy runway
- Safety
Shortly after midnight, at the end of a long, demanding duty day, a regional jet carrying 49 passengers landed on a snow-contaminated runway without the crew carrying out the landing-distance assessment required by company policy, and ran off the end of the runway. The National Transportation Safety Board found this poor decision-making likely reflected the effects of fatigue from the long duty day, and the cockpit voice recorder captured both pilots saying they were tired. Flight and duty time rules that permitted such a duty day were cited as contributing.
Case US-aviation-09Report an issue
Feb 2007 · Ohio, United States
Regional jet overruns runway; captain awake most of 32 hours
- Safety
A regional jet operating a commuter flight ran off the end of a snow-covered runway at an Ohio airport. The NTSB found the captain's fatigue contributed, and so did the airline's failure to administer its attendance policy so pilots could call in fatigued without fear of reprisal. He had been awake for all but about one hour of the previous 32 hours.
Case US-aviation-05Report an issue
Mar 2006 · Illinois, United States
Controller on four hours' sleep clears a takeoff on a runway an airliner is crossing
- Safety
A tower controller at a major airport cleared an airliner to cross a runway and, less than 15 seconds later, cleared another airliner to take off on the same runway; the departing crew rejected the takeoff and stopped before reaching the crossing point. The controller had worked an 8-hour shift ending at 9:30 p.m. the previous day, had 9 hours off and slept only about 4 hours before returning. The NTSB concluded controller fatigue was most likely a significant factor in this and three other runway incursions and recommended changes to controller scheduling and fatigue training.
Case US-aviation-16Report an issue
Oct 2004 · Missouri, United States
Commuter flight crashes on approach after 14.5-hour duty day
- Safety
A twin-turboprop regional aircraft operating a commuter flight struck trees on a night approach to a Missouri airport; 13 of 15 on board died. The NTSB found the pilots descended below minimums without the runway in sight, and that their fatigue likely contributed to their degraded performance after about 14.5 hours on duty and six flights that day.
Case US-aviation-04Report an issue
Jul 2002 · Florida, United States
Cargo jet lands short at night; both pilots' fatigue contributed
- Safety
A cargo airline's three-engine jet freighter struck trees and landed short of the runway on a night visual approach to a Florida airport; the three crew were injured and the aircraft destroyed. The NTSB found the crew failed to maintain a proper glidepath, and that a combination of the captain's and first officer's fatigue contributed. The first officer had a reversed day/night reserve schedule.
Case US-aviation-03Report an issue
Jul 2002 · Indiana, United States
Cargo pilot past his 14-hour duty limit after a freight delay crashes on a 3:45 a.m. missed approach
- Safety
A twin-engine aircraft operated by an air cargo company on a night cargo flight crashed during a missed approach at a municipal airport at 3:45 a.m., killing the pilot. His crew day had started at 1:00 p.m. the previous day, and the operator reported he exceeded his 14-hour crew day by 45 minutes because of a freight delay. The NTSB named conditions conducive to pilot fatigue and the operator's inadequate oversight among the factors.
Case US-aviation-15Report an issue
May 2002 · United States
Appeals court upholds FAA reading that airline crew rest must be rechecked against actual flight times, so a flight that would leave the crew short of rest cannot depart
- Legal
Airline industry groups challenged an FAA interpretation that the minimum rest airline crews must get in the 24 hours before completing a flight segment has to be checked against actual expected flight times on the day, not just the original schedule. The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the FAA, noting that protecting crews against acute short-term fatigue was one of the rule's goals and that the FAA must balance flexibility against safety. Under the FAA's interpretation, if a carrier knows or reasonably should know that a segment will leave a crew with less than eight hours of look-back rest, the flight may not leave the gate.
Case US-aviation-19Report an issue
Sep 2001 · Colorado, United States
Controller with under 90 minutes' sleep approves takeoff from a closed runway; cargo jet passes 32 feet from construction lights
- Safety
A cargo jet took off at a major airport from a runway that was closed for construction, after the night-shift controller approved the closed runway on the crew's request. The aircraft passed within 32 feet of construction lights. The controller had worked a morning shift the day before and, in the 9-hour break before her overnight shift, got between 60 and 90 minutes of sleep; the NTSB concluded controller fatigue was most likely a significant factor in this and three other runway incursions.
Case US-aviation-14Report an issue
Jul 2001 · Washington, United States
Controller on his third shift in two days clears a jet across an active runway; landing airliner stops 810 feet short
- Safety
An airport tower controller cleared a jet to cross a runway while a widebody airliner was on short final; the landing airliner stopped only 810 feet short of the crossing jet after maximum braking. It was the controller's third shift in 2 days, and he had slept 4 to 5 hours after one shift and 3 hours after another before starting the incident shift at 2245. He had not done the required visual scan of the runway, and the NTSB concluded controller fatigue was most likely a significant factor in this and three other runway incursions.
Case US-aviation-13Report an issue
Jul 2000 · United States
Charter pilots who must answer a call to report are not resting: appeals court upholds FAA rest-period interpretation
- Legal
A trade group of about fifty on-demand air charter companies challenged an FAA enforcement notice saying that time when an off-duty pilot must stay reachable and report if called does not count toward the required 10 consecutive hours of rest. The U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the FAA on this point, describing such a pilot as effectively on a leash and accepting the FAA's reasoning that a pilot who may be called at any time is less likely to be refreshed and alert. A second scenario, where the pilot may decline a call, was left undecided as unripe.
Case US-aviation-18Report an issue
Jun 1999 · Arkansas, United States
Airliner overruns runway in storm; crew fatigue contributed
- Safety
A twin-jet airliner operated by a major airline overran the runway while landing in a thunderstorm; 11 people died. The NTSB found the crew should have discontinued the approach, and that their impaired performance from fatigue and situational stress contributed. The landing came late at night at the end of a long duty day.
Case US-aviation-02Report an issue
Aug 1997 · Guam, United States (territory)
Airliner hits terrain on night approach; captain's fatigue contributed
- Safety
A foreign airline's wide-body jet struck high terrain on a night approach to an island airport in a US territory; 228 of 254 on board died. The NTSB found the captain failed to brief and fly the non-precision approach properly and the other crew failed to cross-check him, with the captain's fatigue named as a contributing factor.
Case US-aviation-01Report an issue
Mar 1991 · California, United States
Night cargo pilot with about five hours' daytime sleep incapacitated and killed on return leg
- Safety
A cargo pilot for an air cargo operator reported for work at 2:00 a.m., flew an outbound cargo leg, rested at a company apartment and slept about 5 hours, then took off on the return leg at 8:55 p.m. About 1.5 hours later the single-engine aircraft crashed and the pilot was killed. The NTSB found the probable cause was incapacitation of the pilot due to inadequate sleep.
Case US-aviation-12Report an issue
Apr 1990 · California, United States
Airline pilot alone on positioning flight dozes off after 2 hours' sleep; airliner overstressed in loss of control
- Safety
An airline pilot flying a twin-turboprop commuter airliner alone on a positioning flight climbed to 17,500 feet, trimmed for cruise and dozed off several times, then lost control and overstressed the airplane. He had slept only 1.5 to 2 hours in the preceding 24 hours and had never flown the type solo but did not want to wait for a co-pilot. The NTSB found the cause was his poor judgment in attempting the flight while fatigued from lack of sleep.
Case US-aviation-11Report an issue

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How the suite fits

How each product connects to your obligations

Grades describe how strongly a product connects to an obligation. None discharges an obligation, and none carries a compliance warranty.

Fatiguefit4Duty

The regulation names this step

Fatiguefit4Duty supports the fitness-for-duty step Part 117 already requires, giving crew a consistent way to make the declaration and the carrier a record that it acted on the answer.

About Fatiguefit4Duty

Awareness eLearning

The regulation names this step

Awareness eLearning supports the annual fatigue education and awareness training Part 117 requires of every Part 121 carrier, covering fatigue, its effects and countermeasures for crew and schedulers alike.

About Awareness eLearning

Sleepfit

Supports a named obligation

Sleepfit supports the fitness-for-duty declaration 14 CFR 117.5(d) requires before every flight, by measuring what pilots actually sleep between duty periods, which duty-time records cannot show. It screens; diagnosis stays with your clinicians.

About Sleepfit

Was It Fatigue?

Supports a named obligation

Was It Fatigue? supports the fatigue incident reporting and monitoring elements your Fatigue Risk Management Plan commits to, and produces the analysis an NTSB or FAA review will look for.

About Was It Fatigue?

SleepWellBaby

SleepWellBaby is a voluntary benefit. No FAA rule requires it. It supports crew with infants at home to protect the sleep that Part 117's fitness-for-duty declaration assumes.

About SleepWellBaby

Recommended bundle

Where we’d start in aviation

Every bundle is priced on prevalence: your whole cohort gets access, and you pay for the share predicted to need each product. How pricing works.

Recommended · Levels 2 and 3

Prevention Bundle

Proactive fatigue risk: assess, manage and train, with sleep screening underneath.

Alternative · Levels 2, 3 and 5

Fatigue Lifecycle Bundle

Assess, manage, investigate: from the Census to the point of duty to the post-incident review.

Why this pairing in the United States

Part 117 requires a fitness affirmation before flight (117.5(d)) and annual fatigue training (117.9). Fatiguefit4Duty supports the declaration; Awareness eLearning supplies the training content; Sleepfit measures sleep obtained. Fatigue Lifecycle adds Was It Fatigue? for your FRMP reporting.

See what sleep and fatigue mean for your aviation workforce.

Tell us roughly how many people you employ. Your snapshot models how many are likely sleeping poorly and what it costs, from published research for aviation. Then choose who you’d cover, and we’ll take you to the right next step.